PEGASUS : THE WHODUNNIT QUESTION AND THE PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

THE WHODUNNIT QUESTION

#Pegasus. Some of my friends have been pointing out that there is nothing linking anyone to anything. Casually dismissive of clear evidence of the crime itself, they assert that it is pointless to waste the nation’s time “over nothing” as long as there is no perpetrator/s in sight. I am also helpfully reminded that “suspicion however strong is not proof“.

Surprisingly, many of them are lawyers. They should know that it is not necessary to know the identity of the perpetrator to commence an investigation. Indeed, one of the primary purposes of investigation is to ascertain the identity of the actual perpetrator.

The question is, are the facts reasonably sufficient to trigger an investigation/enquiry into the involvement of any particular individual or entity.

Interestingly enough, none disputes the facts involved. They are willing to concede that a crime has been committed or is being committed.

They are, they say, challenging me (almost triumphantly I might add) to link the crime to an individual/entity. They are posing the classical whodunnit question. Of course, I am not missing the smug sarcasm underlying the question. Nevertheless, let me indulge them.

But first, let it not be forgotten, it takes a robust investigation to gather evidence. I am not an investigator, I am a lawyer. I am not skilled or trained in the art of investigation and in the techniques of collection of evidence to present a prosecutable case. Let us leave that part to the specialists.

However, like most other lawyers, I do know something about correlating a bunch of facts that might collectively indicate a prosecutable crime. So, to humour my friends, for the record, let me state the facts they concede, and then the law that should be equally obvious to them as fellow practitioners themselves.

THE PEGASUS FACTS

In this whole Pegasus business, the following are incontestable facts, and to their credit, as already mentioned, my friends do not wish to contest them:

  1. A crime was committed, or is being committed
  2. The scale and complexity of it is such that it had/has to be a pre-meditated, well-considered, well-planned, well-coordinated organised crime
  3. The weapon/device/technique employed to commit the crime is traceable to just one source of ownership
  4. Without exception, the said owner provides the weapon/technique only to “vetted governments”
  5. Without exception, all the victims fall into an easily distinguishable class – a class comprising of persons that has either involved in activities that are unfriendly to a particular entity, or, involved in activities, information of which may be valuable to that entity
  6. The activities of those victims that qualify them as members of the distinguishable class cannot possibly be of such interest to any, but a particular entity (and this is important)

PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 

The above facts elicit a Pavlovian response from lawyers. We tend to look for the cumulative effect of those facts. This is because the principles of appreciation of “Circumstantial Evidence” were drilled into our heads since the time we sat for the lectures on the Law of Evidence and were thereafter recalled frequently in the course of our law practice, and, I might add, asserted time and time again by our Supreme Court and various High Courts.

Those foundational principles of appreciation of Circumstantial Evidence may be summarised as follows:

  1. The “circumstances“ from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established;
  2. Those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly “pointing towards” the guilt of the accused; 
  3. The circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human “PROBABILITY” the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation of any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence. (Please note, the principle says, “probability”, not certainty. Remember, our professors cautioned us against mixing up the meanings of human probability and clinical certainty).   

Incidentally, I have always associated the above principles with a somewhat similar deductive logic contained in an axiomatic statement in the Mahabharata when a very powerful General, also an almost invincible wrestler, was found slain. “If it’s Keechaka that was killed, it must surely be the work of Bhim”, said men that knew fully well that Bhim alone possessed the degree of skills and strength necessary to pull off that feat.

In conclusion my friends, coming back to the principles of Circumstantial Evidence, you cannot pretend to miss the obvious – that the very “circumstances”, the very “facts” that you concede as probably true, offer the “evidence” that you seek. The needle of suspicion unerringly points to just one entity given the existence of a plausible motive, the opportunity and an obvious capacity to do what was done at the scale and complexity involved.

A NOTE ON THE DICTUM “SUSPICION HOWEVER STRONG IS NOT PROOF”

Indeed, suspicion however strong is not proof. However, it has zero applicability to this issue.

Although the words “evidence” and “proof” are often used interchangeably in common parlance, in Jurisprudence they have separate and distinct meanings. Evidence may be roughly stated as all facts or materials that establish one or the other fact relevant to the matter under inquiry. Proof, on the other hand is the sum of all evidence. If all of the evidence fail to add up, the case will fail for want of adequate “proof” of guilt of the accused.

It is thus immediately clear that “Proof” is a matter that concerns the court at the fag end of a trial. The accused would have been charged, they would have stood trial, evidence against them would have been adduced, impeached or rebutted and it is after all of that exercise that the question of “Proof” arises. The court will then examine and evaluate all the evidence to see if the guilt of the accused is “proved” beyond reasonable doubt. It is at that stage that the dictum of “suspicion however strong is not proof” will weigh with the court.

The above dictum should not be mixed up with the requirements of initiating an investigation or enquiry. In order to initiate an investigation or enquiry, no more than prima facie material is necessary. In this case, there is much more than prima facie material.

Thus, the question if the facts are reasonably sufficient to trigger an investigation/enquiry is easily answered in the light of the principles of Circumstantial Evidence. After all, it is just a matter of corelation of facts and judging its cumulative effect. Do the math yourself and let me know your results.

My own personal opinion is this:

That the facts clearly probablise, if not strongly and irrefutably indicate the commission of high crimes (especially considering that Ministers and legislators were targeted) by some person/s holding public office or an entity that fits the description of public institution in India. As to who they could be is a ridiculously easy guess, but it is not necessary to engage in guesswork in this case.

That such facts more than measure up to the standards required for commencement of an investigation to ascertain the identity of the perpetrators and bring them before Justice or initiate such other motion against them as is contemplated by the law.

That, a failure to initiate appropriate proceedings in cases of High Crimes by itself may constitute an act of High Crime.

SATYAMEVA JAYATHE !

Or, if you prefer Latin, VERITAS VINCIT !

TAKING AWAY KERALA HIGH COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER LAKSHADWEEP

It is widely reported that the Lakshadweep administration is considering shifting its legal jurisdiction from the Kerala High Court to the Karnataka High Court. 

This article seeks to examine the constitutionality of the contemplated move by an executive action. 

SOURCE OF JURISDICTION OF KERALA HIGH COURT OVER LAKSHADWEEP 

Originally called the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands, the islands were renamed Lakshadweep by the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Alteration of Name) Act, 1973. Lakshadweep is listed as item 3 the Union Territories List in Schedule I of the Constitution of India. 

The Kerala High Court exercises jurisdiction over Lakshadweep by virtue of Section 60 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. It is noteworthy that it is an Act of Parliament, no less. 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO UNION TERRITORY AND ITS HIGH COURT

Extension of jurisdiction of High Courts to Union territories is dealt with in Article 230 of the Constitution. Clause (1) thereof states that the Parliament may by law “extend” the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or “exclude” the jurisdiction of a High Court from, any Union territory.

Article 231 provides for establishment of a common High Court for two or more States and a Union territory. 

Article 241 (1) states that the Parliament may by law “constitute” a High Court for a Union territory or declare any court in any such territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution. 

CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

This article would perhaps be incomplete without reference to the concept of “separation of powers”. It is one of the simplest, and yet one of the most important constitutional doctrines, and is hence best included here. 

Sovereign power actually comprises of three different kinds of powers, being:

  1. Legislative power, or the power to make laws,
  2. Executive power, or the power to execute (carry out) the law and
  3. Judicial power, or the power to interpret and apply the law.  

Traditionally all three powers were concentrated in the hands of one person – the King. It was clear that this made the King dangerously powerful. There was no entity to check the power of the King and prevent his abuse of powers. This led to the idea of dividing the sovereign’s power into three separate and distinct branches, being the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. Under the said concept, one branch shall not exercise the functions of the others and shall confine itself to its assigned domain. The concept also provides mechanisms for one branch to act as a check on the power of the other branches. 

Separation of powers is part of the basic structure of the constitution and is therefore non-negotiable, meaning, it can neither be amended out of existence nor watered down. 

JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT IS WITHIN LEGISLATIVE DOMAIN 

It is evident from Articles 230, 231 and 241 of the Constitution that the Parliament, and the Parliament alone, is clothed with the power to deal with the jurisdiction of a High Court. As noticed above, it may do so by making law extending jurisdiction of a High Court to a Union Territory or may exclude an existing jurisdiction or may freshly constitute a dedicated High Court for a Union Territory or alternatively, declare any court in such territory to be a High Court for all or any of the purposes of the Constitution.

It is by virtue of an enactment of the Parliament (the States Reorganisation Act, 1956) that the Kerala High Court exercises jurisdiction over Lakshadweep. The executive, a body tasked with carrying out the wishes of the Parliament expressed through its laws, cannot take away, alter or water down a jurisdiction conferred by the Parliament. The Executive cannot even take away a jurisdiction conferred on one of its own institutions or officers, much less one conferred on an entirely different body, the Judiciary. 

The Executive is a body that is subject to the court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the Lakshadweep Administration as well as the Union Government are subject to the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court. Permitting the Administration to do what is contemplated, without the checks and balances of Parliamentary oversight, would be akin to letting them engage in “bench hunting” or “Forum shopping”, the practice of a party choosing a judge/bench that he considers is likely to be favourable to him as compared to other judges/benches. It is deemed a corrupt practice. And, if I might add, if it’s not fair that one gets to choose which Police station shall have jurisdiction in one’s own case, equally, one shouldn’t get to choose which court shall have jurisdiction over one’s own case either. That must be left to the wisdom of a legislative body.

CONCLUSIONS

  1. Matters of jurisdiction of High Courts over Union Territories are clearly outside of the Executive domain. It is a matter that falls squarely within the legislative domain.  
  2. The Union government or the Lakshadweep administration has no constitutional competence to take away the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court over Lakshadweep. 
  3. Any action otherwise than by a law enacted by the Parliament that takes away or attempts to take away the jurisdiction of the Kerala High Court over Lakshadweep would be a clear violation of Constitutional provisions and an affront to the concept of Separation of Powers. 

DR. THAROOR WAS RIGHT, WHOLLY RIGHT AND NOTHING BUT RIGHT

HIS STATEMENT

To me, politics has to be about ideas, or it’s nothing. If you are interested in a career without convictions and principles, you may as well be a banker or lawyer or accountant and make money, or a chief executive and wield power.”, said the erudite and articulate Dr. Shashi Tharoor. 

THE CONTROVERSY

I had occasion to read the article from which that statement is, well, surgically extracted. The instant my eyes fell on those words, I smiled, and this is despite being a lawyer myself. Knowing my brothers in the profession only too well, I knew instinctively that the affable gentleman had it coming. Personally, of course, I had no doubt in my mind that Dr. Tharoor didn’t insinuate anything even remotely close to the nature of the meaning that would be assigned to his words. 

Very predictably, a section of lawyers is alleging that Dr. Tharoor has insulted the legal profession. It is alleged that he said that lawyers lack loyalty and principles. Based on this, they seek to extract an apology from Dr. Tharoor. 

STANDARD OF JUDGMENT

Now, we in the law are supposed to judge this by a well-established standard – the conclusion “a reasonable person of ordinary common-sense” would draw in this scenario. Judging what he said by that gold standard, I am unable to persuade myself that a reasonable man of ordinary common-sense would take it that Dr. Tharoor meant to imply that banking, law, accountancy, and the like attract unscrupulous characters. Let me substantiate my point. 

PERSONAL VERSUS PROFESSIONAL

By its very nature, banking, law, accountancy and even the practice of medicine are not professions that demand a set of pre-existing personal political convictions that are necessary for the practice of those professions. Of course, each profession has its ethical code which must be observed in the line of practice of that profession. 

It is impossible to miss an important distinction. Dr. Tharoor was speaking about “personal” views or convictions or ideals. He was not referring to “professional” ethics or conduct. 

Clearly, he meant, and I would say, rightly too, that people of varying or divergent personal political convictions and ideals may practice the profession of banking or law or accountancy because the career is not one that demands “personal” political convictions. 

However, a career in politics is predicated on personal political convictions. If you choose to be a politician, you must choose a camp that represents your personal convictions. You cannot switch to one that represents a conflicting set of convictions. 

IF IN DOUBT, TAKE MEANING FROM THE CONTEXT

I would suggest that we lawyers don’t act forgetting the rule of contextual interpretation. In the event of a literal interpretation yielding unreasonable or absurd constructs, one shall employ contextual interpretation. 

If one wishes to examine the matter contextually which, I might add, is the only way to examine it, one shall have to go through the entire article. And then it would become abundantly clear that the implication sought to be placed on the particular words, divorced from its intended context, is so absurdly strained and contrived that no person of reasonable prudence would ever be able to arrive at that conclusion. 

BUT ANYWAY, AREN’T WE LAWYERS DUTY BOUND TO ACT REGARDLESS OF CONFLICTING PERSONAL CONVICTIONS 

As a matter of fact, whatever ethical rules of conduct many of us lawyers may forget, we cannot pretend to forget the most important one known even to laymen. It is that we shall defend a person accused of a crime regardless of our personal opinion, views or convictions. 

Likewise with doctors, they shall do their duty regardless of what they feel about the patient. likewise with policemen and likewise soldiers, they shall follow orders and perform duties regardless of their own personal views. 

But NOT so with politicians. For them it is reverse. They shall NOT serve in conflict with their personal convictions. 

LETS BE REASONABLE

So, whose standards are we adopting to judge his statement? That of the “reasonable person of ordinary common-sense” or that of a petulant busybody ? I shall have to leave that to your good judgment.